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SEX DISCRIMINATION AND INSURANCE FOR
CONTRACEPTION
Sylvia A. Law*
Abstract: Unintended pregnancy is a serious problem in the United States. Most private
insurance plans do not pay for contraception even though they pay for other prescription
drugs and devices. This Article argues that this pattern constitutes sex discrimination and is
prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. It discusses the reasons this issue has been neglected and suggests ways
federal and state officials might remedy this common form of gender discrimination.
More U.S. women confront unintended pregnancy than women in
nearly every other developed country. One reason is that most
employment-based health insurance programs in the United States
exclude payment for contraceptives from otherwise comprehensive
coverage for prescription drugs and medical services. The Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
(PDA), prohibits discrimination in the provision of employee health
benefits "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical
conditions."' This Article considers whether the exclusion and limitation
of coverage for contraceptive services in employment-based insurance
programs violates the PDA.
Part I explores the incidence of unintended pregnancy and the
medical, fiscal, social, and personal costs associated with it, and
considers the ways in which lack of insurance coverage for contraception
contributes to the problem of unwanted pregnancy. Part II describes
patterns of delivery and financing of contraceptive services in the
United States. Part III argues that the PDA prohibits employers from
* Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law, Medicine and Psychiatry, NYU Law School.
This Article originated when Kathryn Kolbert, Vice President of the Center for Reproductive Law
and Policy, asked me whether Title VII prohibits employee benefit plans from discriminating against
contraception. I was surprised to discover that the issue had never been addressed in law review
literature or case law. Professor Sue Ross, a principal architect of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978, generously shared her insight into the meaning of that law. Many other people provided me
with information and insight, including Janet Benshoof, Cary LaCheen, Roberta Riley, Kathy Kneer,
and Theresa Connor. Martha Field and Katherine Franke critiqued an earlier draft. Jessica Tsai and
John Marshall Bellwoar provided magnificent research and editorial help. My assistant, Leslie
Jenkins, provided invaluable aid throughout. The NYU Law School's Filomen D'Agostino and Max
E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund provided financial support. I am grateful for all their help.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
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discriminating against women by excluding or limiting coverage for
contraceptive services. Part IV asks why, if excluding contraception from
employment-based health insurance is pervasive, damaging, and illegal
(in other words, a slam-dunk legal argument), no one has noticed or
asserted it. Part V discusses the impact and limits of applying the PDA to
prohibit discrimination against contraception. Finally, Part VI describes
and evaluates alternative ways in which the PDA might be enforced and
considers state and federal proposals to increase insurance coverage for
contraception.
I. UNINTENDED PREGNANCY IN THE UNITED STATES
Almost sixty percent of the 6.3 million pregnancies that occur
annually in the United States are unintended? This rate is higher than
that in any other developed country except France and much higher than
most developed countries.3 Many factors contribute to unintended
pregnancy.4 One important cause is the failure to use effective forms of
birth control; more than half of all unintended pregnancies occur among
the ten percent of American women who report that they do not use birth
control.' One reason why women do not use birth control is that health
insurance commonly excludes coverage for effective forms of
contraception that physicians provide.6 This Part explores the adverse
consequences of unintended pregnancy that flow, in significant part,
from the exclusion of contraception from private insurance. Unintended
pregnancy: (1) increases infant mortality and morbidity; (2) generates
financial costs for childbirth and the care of distressed newborns;
(3) leads to high rates of abortion; and (4) limits women's abilities to
2. Institute of Medicine, The Best Intentions: Unintended Pregnancy and the Well-Being of
Children and Families I (Sarah S. Brown & Leon Eisenberg eds., 1995) [hereinafter Best
Intentions].
3. Elise F. Jones et al., Unintended Pregnancy, Contraceptive Practice and Family Planning
Services in Developed Countries, 20 Fano. Plan. Persp. 53, 55 (1988).
4. Among teens, research suggests that one of the most important factors explaining the very high
rates of unintended pregnancy in the United States is a general lack of candor about sexuality and
conception, reflected in weak school-based sex education programs and the absence of frank
discussions of contraception in the media, particularly in advertising. See Elise F. Jones et al.,
Teenage Pregnancy in Developed Countries: Determinants and Policy Implications, 17 Fain. Plan.
Persp. 53, 54-58 (1985).
5. Alan Guttmacher Institute, Contraception Counts: State-by-State Information, May 1997, at 1.
6. See infra Part II.
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perform and contribute to society and undermines national economic
stability.
A. Unintended Pregnancy Increases Infant Mortality and Morbidity
Like the rates of unintended pregnancy, U.S. infant mortality and
morbidity rates are higher than those of any other developed country and,
indeed, higher than rates in many developing countries.7 Many studies
find that unintended pregnancy is the major explanation for these harms
that newborns suffer.' These studies also show that increasing access to
contraception is an important step in reducing infant mortality and
morbidity.
It is not surprising that unintended pregnancies are more likely to
produce unhealthy babies.9 Pregnancy produces tremendous burdens on a
woman's body and life, and an infant makes even greater demands on the
mother and family. When a woman and family plan a child, they are
better prepared to make the necessary sacrifices to meet the infant's
needs. But when pregnancy is unintended, responding to the demands of
pregnancy and infancy is much more difficult. °
The adverse effects of unintended pregnancy do not end in infancy.
Unwanted children and adolescents are nearly twice as likely as wanted
children to receive psychiatric care for both mild and severe
7. Best Intentions, supra note 2, at 66-72. In 1985, the U.S. infant mortality rate ranked
nineteenth in the world, worse than countries such as Singapore and Spain. George J. Annas et al.,
American Health Law 924 (1990). When comparing only the white U.S. infant mortality rate with
other nations, the United States ranked fourteenth, worse than Japan and Hong Kong. Id. The U.S.
black infant mortality rate ranked twenty-eighth, behind countries with fewer medical and economic
resources such as Cuba and Bulgaria, and equal to Costa Rica. Id.
In 1991, 7% of all infants in the United States were born too small, and 11% were born too soon.
Patricia H. Shiono & Richard E. Behrman, Low Birth Weight: Analysis and Recommendations,
5 Future of Children 4,4 (1995).
8. For example, the National Commission to Prevent Infant Mortality reported: "If all pregnancies
were planned, infant mortality could be reduced by an estimated 10 percent and low birthweight by
12 percent." National Comm'n to Prevent Infant Mortality, Troubling Trends: The Health of
America's Next Generation 38 (1990) [hereinafter Troubling Trends].
9. "The child of an unwanted conception especially (as distinct from a mistimed one) is at greater
risk of being born at low birthweights, of dying in its first year of life, of being abused, and of not
receiving sufficient resources for healthy development." Best Intentions, supra note 2, at 1.
10. See McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 668-73, 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (summarizing
evidence that woman's attitude toward her pregnancy is extremely important factor in determining
whether pregnancy poses threat to her life or health, and noting that woman who is unable and
unwilling to bear children often experiences great stress in pregnancy, which adversely affects her
medical condition).
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psychological disorders. In addition, they are twice as likely to have
a record of juvenile delinquency and three times more likely to have a
record of adult criminal activity. 2
B. Unintended Pregnancy Generates Increased Financial Costs
Even if unintended pregnancy results in a healthy baby, the financial
costs of childbirth are much greater than the costs of many years of
contraception.' 3 If the unintended pregnancy results in a distressed
newborn, the costs are even greater. "For every low-weight birth that is
averted, the health care system saves between $14,000 and $30,000 in
hospitalization costs associated with low birth weight in the first year of
life."' 4 It was estimated that by 1990:
[T]he nation will have spent at least $2.1 billion in first-year costs
alone to care for the excess numbers of low-birth weight infants
who need extensive medical care and whose tragic situations could
have been averted had the nation moved more rapidly to reduce the
incidence of low birth weight.'5
11. See Born Unwanted: Developmental Effects of Denied Abortion 41 (Henry P. David et al.
eds., 1988).
12. Id. at 42.
13. In 1993, the cost of oral contraceptives and associated physical exams was $1500 for five
years, while the cost of Norplant was $700 for the same period. The cost of an IUD, which remains
effective for eight years, was about $500. Alan Guttmacher Institute, Uneven & Unequal: Insurance
Coverage and Reproductive Health Services 4 (1995) [hereinafter Uneven & Unequal]. By contrast,
the cost of maternity care for a normal vaginal delivery was $4334 in 1989, and the cost of a
Caesarean-section was $7186. Id. at 3.
In a study comparing medical costs of 15 contraceptive methods with no contraceptive method, it
was found that regardless of the contraceptive method used, contraception saves money. James
Trussell et al., The Economic Value of Contraception: A Comparison of 15 Methods, 85 Am. J. Pub.
Health 494, 494 (1995). Over five years, the most cost-effective methods were the copper-T IUD,
vasectomy, the contraceptive implant, and the injectable contraceptive, saving $14,122, $13,899,
$13,813, and $13,373 respectively. Id Oral contraceptives saved $12,879, and barrier methods,
spermicides, withdrawal, and periodic abstinence saved $8933 to $12,239. Id. The researchers found
that "savings generally are realized by third-party payers.... [B]usinesses and individuals receive an
economic benefit if these savings yield lower premiums and increased profits or wages." Id. at 500;
see also Dona J. Lethbridge & Kathleen M. Hanna, Promoting Effective Contraceptive Use 12
(1997).
14. Annas et al., supra note 7, at 930 (citing Office of Technology Assessment, Healthy Children:
Investing in the Future 85 (1988)).
15. Children's Defense Fund, The Health of Americas Children: Maternal and Child Health
Data Book 25 (1987).
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Reducing unintended pregnancy is the single most effective means of
reducing the number of distressed, low birth weight babies. 6
C. Unintended Pregnancy Often Ends in Abortion
The U.S. abortion rate is higher than that of any Western European
country. 7 Almost half (forty-four percent) of all unintended pregnancies
in the United States end in abortion. 8 Abortion imposes enormous
financial 9 and psychic' costs on women even when it is legal. President
Clinton asserts that abortion should be "safe and legal, but rare."2' But
abortion cannot be rare unless women have access to contraception.
D. Unintended Pregnancy Limits Women's Abilities to Perform and
Contribute to Society and Undermines National Economic Stability
In addition to its emotional, financial, and human costs, unintended
pregnancy damages the national and world economies and communities.
The adverse social and economic consequences of unintended pregnancy
fall most harshly on women. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that
reality when it upheld a woman's right to choose abortion in Planned
16. Best Intentions, supra note 2, at 70.
17. Jeannie .Rosoff, Not Just Teenagers, 20 Fam. Plan. Persp. 52, 52 (1988). The U.S. abortion
rate is exceeded only by that in the developed countries of Eastern Europe and developing countries
with strong population control policies. Of the developed countries, only the following have abortion
rates higher than the U.S. rate of 27.5 per 100 pregnancies: Albania (31.2); Bulgaria (45.4); Czech
Republic (33.5); Hungary (40.7); and Slovak Republic (32A). In contrast, the following Western
European countries have abortion rates much lower than the United States: England and Wales
(19.0); Finland (13.3); Netherlands (9.6); and Scotland (15.0). Alan Guttmacher Institute, Number of
Legal Abortions, Abortion Rate and Abortion Ratio: Countries with Accurate Abortion Statistics
tbl. I (Apr. 1997) (unpublished table, on file with Alan Guttmacher Institute); see also Stanley K.
Henshaw, InducedAbortion: A WorldReview, 22 Fam. Plan. Persp. 76,78 (1990).
18. Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, Epidemiology of Unintended Pregnancy and Contraceptive Use,
170 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 1485, 1485 (1994).
19. Most women pay for abortions with cash in advance. In 1993, clinics charged an average of
$341 for an abortion at 10 weeks with local anesthesia; abortion costs generally ranged from $140 to
$1700. Stanley K. Henshaw, Factors Hindering Access to Abortion Services, 27 Fam. Plan. Persp.
54, 57 (1995). Furthermore, because 84% of U.S. counties have no abortion provider, women often
must travel to obtain services. Stanley K. Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Abortion Services in the
United States, 1991 and 1992,26 Fano. Plan. Persp. 100, 100 (1994).
20. Often women seeking abortions must confront hostile and sometimes violent demonstrators.
Stanley K. Henshaw, The Accessibility of Abortion Services in the United States, 23 Fam. Plan.
Persp. 246,250 (1991).
21. President's Remarks on Signing Memorandums on Medical Research and Reproductive
Health and an Exchange with Reporters, 1 Pub. Papers 7 (Jan. 22, 1993).
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Parenthood v. Casey, stating that "[t]he ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated
by their ability to control their reproductive lives."'22 Unplanned and
unwanted pregnancies undermine women's abilities by precluding
women from participating fully in the "marketplace and the world of
ideas. ' "2
In 1995, the President's Council on Sustainable Development
identified six important factors in sustaining national economic growth;
access to family planning services was one of those factors.24 The
Council recommended "[e]xpanding private insurance to cover the full
range of reproductive health services"'  and described the social and
economic damages caused by unintended pregnancy:
Because the United States has the world's third largest population
and the largest economy, with an unparalleled scale of per capita
consumption and waste generation, even slight changes in
U.S. consumption patterns or population size can have a significant
impact on sustainability.... [C]ontinued population growth
steadily makes more difficult the job of mitigating the environ-
mental impact of American resource use and waste production
patterns.26
Thus, while unintended pregnancies are most damaging to the individual
women who experience them, they also cause significant harm to society
and the economy as a whole.
II. PATTERNS OF DELIVERY AND FINANCING
CONTRACEPTIVE SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES
Sterilization is the most commonly used form of contraception in the
United States. It is also the only medically prescribed and provided
contraceptive service available to both men and women. In 1990, forty-
two percent of all contraceptive users in the United States were protected
22. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
23. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975).
24. See The President's Council on Sustainable Development, Sustainable America: A New
Consensusfor Prosperity, Opportunity, and a Healthy Environmentfor the Future ch. 6 (1996).
25. Id. at 146.
26. Id. at 143.
27. Linda J. Piccinino & William D. Mosher, Trends in Contraceptive Use in the United States:
1982-1995,30 Fam. Plan. Persp. 4,5 (1998).
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by sterilization (29.5% by female sterilization and 12.6% by
vasectomy).28 While sterilization is a safe and effective method of
contraception, it has serious disadvantages. It requires surgery and is, as
a practical matter, irreversible.29 Nevertheless, surgical sterilization is the
form of contraception most commonly covered by private insurance.3"
Women in the United States confront significant barriers to access to
other effective forms of reversible contraception.3 Perhaps this explains
why so many more people in the United States choose sterilization than
in any other country.
The contraceptive pill is one of the most commonly used forms of
reversible contraception,32 used by twenty-seven percent of women who
practice contraception in the United States.33 The pill is safe and highly
effective when used properly.34 Except for health maintenance
28. William D. Mosher & Christine A. Bachrach, Understanding U.S. Fertility: Continuity and
Change in the National Survey of Family Growth, 1988-1995,28 Fano. Plan. Persp. 4, 6 (1996).
29. Many women, especially younger women, who are sterilized come to regret their decision.
Institute of Medicine, Contraceptive Research and Development: Looking to the Future 192 (Polly
F. Harrison & Allan Rosenfield eds., 1996) [hereinafter Looking to the Future].
30. Across the range of insurance plans, on average 86% cover all forms of surgical sterilization,
while 90% of point-of-service networks cover both male and female sterilization. Uneven &
Unequal, supra note 13, at 9.
The Alan Guttmacher Institute's 1995 study, Uneven & Unequal, was the first large-scale,
comprehensive study of private insurance coverage of reproductive health care services in the United
States. Id. at 5. The researchers distinguished four types of private health insurance. First, conven-
tional indemnity plans reimburse a patient or a provider for covered services up to a specified dollar
amount and account for 58% of insured employees. Second, a preferred provider organization (PPO)
gives enrollees the option either to obtain care from a designated "preferred" provider or from an
outside provider. An enrollee obtaining care from an out-of-network provider typically pays a higher
cost-sharing amount. Third, in point-of-service plans, a primary physician acts as a gatekeeper to a
network of specialists. Twenty-three percent of insured employees are enrolled in PPOs and similar
point-of-service plans. Fourth, "[h]ealth maintenance organizations (HMOs) provide a defined,
comprehensive set of health services to an enrolled population within a specified geographic service
area. Providers are typically reimbursed on a capitated or other 'at risk' arrangement." Id. Nineteen
percent of employees were enrolled in HMOs. Id.
31. See Rosoff, supra note 17, at 52.
32. Roberto Rivera, Oral Contraceptives: The Last Decade, in Contraceptive Research and
Development: 1984 to 1994: The Road from Mexico City to Cairo and Beyond 24 (P.F.A. Van Look
& G. Ptrez-Palacios eds., 1994) [hereinafter Contraceptive Research and Development].
33. See Piccinino & Mosher, supra note 27, at 5.
34. The contraceptive pill has been subject to more studies to identify serious side effects than any
other medicine in history. Sharon Snider, The Pill: 30 Years of Safety Concerns, FDA Consumer,
Dec. 1990, at 8, 9. Over the years, scientists and drug companies have developed new formulations
with lower doses. Pills marketed today have little effect on the risks of heart disease or stroke in
healthy women who do not smoke. Id. While the relation between any drug and cancer is difficult to
evaluate, the pill appears not to increase the risk of breast cancer and reduces the risk of cancer of the
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organizations (HMOs), about two-thirds of private insurance plans
exclude coverage for contraceptive pills, even though virtually all private
insurance plans include coverage for other prescription drugs.3' There is
no FDA-approved contraceptive pill for men.36
Barrier methods, including the diaphragm and male and female
condoms, are the third most popular contraceptive in the United States,
used by 20.3% of contraceptive users.37 Barrier methods have the added
advantage of providing some protection against sexually transmitted
diseases. However, they are much less effective in preventing pregnancy
than other forms of contraception. 3' The male condom is available over
the counter, while the diaphragm must be prescribed and fitted by a
physician. Except for HMOs, over three-quarters of all U.S. private
insurers exclude coverage for female diaphragms.39
Intrauterine devices (IUDs) are largely unavailable in the United
States today, even though in Europe they are used by more than one
quarter of all women using contraception.4" The IUD is highly effective,
has few adverse side effects in most women, and is the least expensive
ovaries and of the endometrium; it may, however, increase the risk of uterine cancer. Rivera, supra
note 32, at 30-32. The pill is less effective in actual use than in controlled settings because women
must remember to use it every day. Robert A. Hatcher et al., Contraceptive Technology 119 (16th
rev. ed. 1994).
35. Only 31% of non-HMO insured plans with less than 15 employees include coverage for pills.
Only 32% of plans with less than 100 employees, and 33% of plans with more than 100 employees
include coverage. Uneven & Unequal, supra note 13, at 9. However, between 95% and 97% of these
plans include coverage for other prescription drugs. Id. By contrast, 89% of HMOs include
prescription drug coverage and 84% of them cover contraceptive pills. Id.
36. Christina Wang et al., Male Contraception: 1993 and Beyond, in Contraceptive Research and
Development, supra note 32, at 121, 122-28. Both national and international agencies have
conducted clinical trials on the suppression of sperm production by hormonal methods. These
methods, however, have several problems, including lower efficiency in Caucasian men, the need for
several months of treatment before the effects are induced, and relatively high cost. Id. at 125.
37. The National Academy of Science reports that among couples who are married or in "union,"
14.6% rely upon condoms and 5.7% use diaphragms. Looking to the Future, supra note 29, at 172-
73.
38. Stanley K. Henshaw & Kathryn Kost, Abortion Patients in 1994-1995: Characteristics and
Contraceptive Use, 28 Fam. Plan. Persp. 140, 146 (1996). Among typical users in 1988, 16% of
couples using condoms experienced an unwanted pregnancy within the first year of use. Hatcher
et al., supra note 34, at 115. A 1996 study by the Institute of Medicine reports an average one-year
failure rate of 3% for combined oral contraceptives and 12% for condoms. Looking to the Future,
supra note 29, at 96, 98.
39. Between 19% and 21% of indemnity plans cover diaphragms, while 23% of PPOs and 81% of
HMOs do so. Uneven & Unequal, supra note 13, at 9.
40. Katherine Treiman et al., 1UDs-An Update, Population Rep., Dec. 1995, at 1, 25.
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form of contraception.4' IUDs are unavailable to most women in the
United States in part because doctors are not trained to provide them.42 In
addition, three-quarters of indemnity insurers and preferred provider
organizations (PPOs) exclude coverage for IUDs.43
Norplant, a recent contraceptive alternative, consists of six plastic
matchstick size capsules containing the hormone progestin implanted
under a woman's skin.' By 1995, nearly one million U.S. women used
Norplant.as Norplant has been subject to extensive testing and appears to
be highly effective and safe.46 Three-quarters of indemnity insurers and
PPOs exclude coverage for Norplant.47 Even though IUDs and Norplant
are more economical than pills because they remain effective for many
years, the cost for many years of protection must be paid up front.4' This
one-time cost creates a price barrier for women who do not have
insurance coverage for contraception and hence must pay out of pocket.49
41. See Irving Sivin, JUDs: A Look to the Future, in Contraceptive Research and Development,
supra note 32, at 37, 39-44.
42. Patricia Cohen, The IUD: Birth-Control Device That the U.S. Market Won't Bear, Wash. Post,
Aug. 6, 1996, at Al. The unavailability of the IUD is influenced by the fact that an early version of
the device, the Dalkon Shield, was marketed aggressively and later found highly defective. Many
women were injured, suits ensued, and the manufacturer declared bankruptcy. See generally Richard
B. Sobol, Bending the Law: The Story of the Dalkon Shield Bankruptcy (1991).
43. Uneven & Unequal, supra note 13, at 9.
44. See Sheldon Segal, A New Delivery System for Contraceptive Steroids, 157 Am. J. Obstetrics
& Gynecology 1090 (1987).
45. Albert George Thomas Jr. & Stephanie M. LeMelle, The Norplant System: Where Are We in
1995, 40 J. Fam. Prac. 125, 125 (1995).
46. See Rosemarie Thau & Ann Robbins, New Implant Systems for Men and Women, in
Contraceptive Research andDevelopment, supra note 32, at 91, 92.
47. Only 23% of insured plans with less than 100 employees cover Norplant, while 27% of self-
insured plans and PPOs do so. Uneven & Unequal, supra note 13, at 9.
48. See supra note 13 (discussing costs).
49. Birth Control Implant Gains Among Poor Under Medicaid, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1992, at Al.
Women who do not qualify as poor generally obtain contraceptive services from private physicians.
Poorer women rely upon clinics. In 1994, almost 6.6 million women received contraceptive services
from more than 7000 subsidized family planning clinics. Jennifer J. Frost, Family Planning Clinic
Services in the United States, 1994, 28 Fam. Plan. Persp. 92, 92 (1996). A variety of programs
provide public financial support for family planning: Medicaid, federal funds provided under Title X
of the Public Health Service Act, and state and local grants.
Title X is the popular name for the Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1506 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-8 (1994)). Through
block grants to states, Title X allocates funds to qualified family planning providers. The
congressional purpose behind Title X was "to make comprehensive, voluntary family planning
services, and information relating thereto, readily available to all persons." 116 Cong. Rec. 24,094
(1970).
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In summary, only fifteen percent of traditional indemnity plans cover
all of the most commonly used reversible prescription contraceptives,
and forty-nine percent of plans cover none of these methods." This data
reveals several patterns of discrimination. Most insurance plans treat all
forms of reversible contraception disfavorably relative to other medical
services, drugs, and devices.' Furthermore, most insurance plans treat
prescription contraception used only by women (i.e., pills, diaphragms,
IUDs, and Norplant) less favorably than medical forms of contraception
used by men (i.e., sterilization). 2 Condoms, which both men and women
may purchase and use, are, like other forms of non-prescription drugs,
not typically covered by health insurance. 3
Insurance coverage patterns also reveal a preference for irreversible
sterilization over reversible forms of contraception.' The reasons for this
preference are not clear. Indeed, treating permanent sterilization more
favorably than reversible forms of contraception seems perverse. One
possible explanation is that insurance has traditionally favored surgical
services over other medical services. Today, however, virtually all
insurance plans cover prescription drugs other than contraception.55
III. THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT AND INSURANCE
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CONTRACEPTIVE USERS
This Part considers the meaning of discrimination in the context of
employee benefit plans that offer employees comprehensive coverage for
In 1994, more than 85% of all U.S. counties had a least one clinic providing subsidized family
planning services, and nearly three-quarters had at least one Title X-funded provider. Frost, supra at
97. Nonetheless, subsidized family planning clinics serve, on average, only 44% of all low-income,
sexually-active women who need subsidized contraceptive services. In some states, family planning
clinics serve more than 75% of all women in need, whereas in other states, they serve fewer than
30% of such women. Id. at 100.
50. Uneven & Unequal, supra note 13, at 12.
51. Ninety-seven percent of indemnity plans cover prescription drugs, but only 33% of such plans
cover oral contraception. Ninety-nine percent of PPOs cover prescription drugs, but only 41% cover
contraception. Uneven & Unequal, supra note 13, at 16.
52. See supra notes 30 (sterilization), 35 (oral contraception), 39 (diaphragms), 43 (IUDs), 47
(Norplant) and accompanying text..
53. Further, while condoms are useful in preventing sexually transmitted diseases, as a form of
birth control they are far less reliable than pills, Norplant, or IUDs. Among abortion patients who
were using a method of contraception during the month they became pregnant, the condom was the
method most commonly used. Henshaw & Kost, supra note 38, at 146.
54. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 51.
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medically necessary physician services, and drugs and devices prescribed
by a physician and approved by the FDA, but exclude coverage for
reversible forms of contraceptive services, drugs, and devices. As
explained in Part II, this pattern is common.56 Apart from HMOs, the
typical insurance plan offered by U.S. employers and insurers excludes
coverage for reversible forms of contraception. 7 The typical policy
provides men coverage for all physician services and prescription drugs
and devices, but denies women coverage for medical services and
prescribed drugs and devices for reversible contraception. 8 These plans
thus discriminate against women.
A. The Basic Title VI1 Claims
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an
employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."5 9 This
prohibition applies to the benefits an employer provides its employees,
including health insurance coverage, because "[h]ealth insurance and
other fringe benefits are 'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment. 60
Title VII prohibits employer policies that discriminate against women
intentionally or explicitly. In the hiring context, explicit sex-based
56. Typical employment-based health insurance plans of all forms exclude coverage for services,
drugs, and devices that are for "pre-existing conditions," Rand E. Rosenblatt et al., Law and the
American Health Care System 282-83 (1997), or are "experimental," id. at 211-15, 238-44, or "not
medically necessary," id. at 147-59, 224-29. Obviously, insurance plans that cover prescription
drugs do not pay for over-the-counter drugs and cosmetics not prescribed by a physician. In addition,
these plans typically impose deductibles and co-insurance requirements. See Sylvia A. Law & Barry
Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians' Fees: Individual Patients or Society? (A Case Study in
Federalism), 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 8 n.34 (1986). This Article does not address these common
limitations on insurance coverage, except insofar as employers and insurers impose greater limits on
payment for contraceptive services than are imposed on other medical services.
57. See supra Part 11.
58. For example, General Electric's insurance plan included coverage for services "such as
prostatectomies, vasectomies, and circumcisions that are specific to the reproductive system of
men." General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 152 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).
60. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983). See
generally Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1079 (1983) (finding that there is
"no question" that deferred compensation plan constitutes condition or privilege of employment, and
retirement benefits are compensation under Title VI1).
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discrimination can be justified only if the employer demonstrates that
gender is a "bona fide occupational qualification," which requires the
employer to show that "the essence of the business operation would be
undermined" by hiring either women or men.6' Title VII also prohibits
employer policies that are neutral in form but discriminatory in effect. To
establish a prima facie disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must show that
the challenged employment practices "in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another, without justification." 62
Many reasons support the claim that excluding contraceptives from
otherwise comprehensive coverage for physician services and
prescription drugs disproportionately impacts women. The current state
of technology permits prescription contraceptives only for women. Thus,
when an employer covers all prescription drugs except for contraception,
the discrimination against women is explicit. Because this character-
ization is based on technological limitations, however, treating the
exclusion of coverage for prescription contraceptives as a facially neutral
policy that has a discriminatory impact upon women seems more
appropriate.63
Insurance policies that exclude coverage for contraception dispro-
portionately impact women for two reasons. First, because all of the
medically prescribed reversible methods of contraception must be
obtained and used by women, they bear all of the physical risks and
hassles that accompany obtaining and using reversible contraception.
Second, because employment-based insurance plans that ordinarily cover
prescription drugs single out and exclude coverage for contraception,
women bear a disproportionate share of the out-of-pocket financial costs
of health care services. Women spend approximately sixty-eight percent
more in out-of-pocket health care costs than men.' More than twice as
many women (7.4 million compared with 3.4 million men) had out-of-
61. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385,388 (5th Cir. 1971).
62. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 681 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977) (invalidating height and weight requirements for prison
guards that disproportionately excluded women and were not correlated to amount of strength
"essential to good job performance").
63. The Reagan Administration argued that claims of discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
could not be based on a theory of disparate impact, but courts have rejected that claim. See, e.g.,
Scher v. Woodland Sch. Community Consol. Dist. No. 50, 867 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding
disparate impact where employer applied rule against combination of paid sick leave and unpaid
leave more strictly to pregnant workers than non-pregnant workers).
64. Women's Research and Education Institute, Women's Health Insurance Costs and
Experiences 2 (1994).
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pocket expenditures for health care services that exceeded ten percent of
their income.' The costs of prescription contraceptives, excluded from
general insurance coverage, account for the largest portion of this
disparity."
Even if technology were to make effective prescription contraception
available to men, excluding contraception from insurance coverage
would still disproportionately impact women. Women, and only women,
bear all of the physical burdens of unwanted pregnancy.
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case that a policy has a
disproportionate adverse impact upon women, the employer may defend
the policy by showing it is justified by business necessity.67 It is difficult
to imagine how an employer could show that "business necessity"
requires excluding prescription contraceptive services from insurance
coverage.
Historically, employment-based health insurance plans excluded
vaginal deliveries and neonatal care from coverage. 8 In 1974, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that denying medical and disability insurance for
medical problems related to pregnancy was not a form of sex
discrimination prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.69 Two years
later, the Court held in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert that an otherwise-
comprehensive insurance program that excluded pregnancy-related
disabilities from disability coverage did not constitute sex discrimination
prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.70 In upholding
the policy, the Court stated:
[The policy] does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility
because of gender but merely removes one physical condition-
pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities. While it is
true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
classification ....
The program divides potential recipients into two groups-
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is
65. Id. at 6.
66. 1La at 10-11.
67. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331-32.
68. See Law & Ensminger, supra note 56, at 59-60.
69. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
70. General Elee. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976).
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exclusively female, the second includes members of both
sexes.... [T]here is no risk from which men are protected and
women are not... [and] no risk from which women are protected
and men are not.7
Applying this rationale to insurance coverage for reversible
contraception, employers could argue that excluding reversible
contraception from reimbursable services "does not exclude anyone from
benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one" service
from the list of compensable items. "While it is true that only women can
become pregnant," so the argument would go, it does not follow that
every insurance policy classification touching on pregnancy is a sex-
based classification. The common U.S. insurance programs under
consideration here merely "divide potential recipients into two groups"--
those who seek to avoid pregnancy and those who do not.
Thus, employers could argue that this division is not sex-based
discrimination because both men and women might seek to avoid
pregnancy. Because contraceptive services are denied to both men and
women equally, employers might argue as in Gilbert that "there is no
risk from which men are protected and women are not... [and] no risk
from which women are protected and men are not."72
B. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Congress rejected Gilbert's assertion that discrimination against
pregnant women was not discrimination based on sex by adopting the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA).73 The PDA prohibits
covered employers from discriminating "on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions" and requires that "women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt
of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work."'74 Thus, the
71. Id. at 134-38 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97).
72. Id. at 138 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97).
73. Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994)); see also
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 277 n.6 (1987); Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,670-71 n.1 (1983).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The full text of subsection (k) states:
The terms "because of sex" or"on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to, because of or
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by
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legitimacy of denying employees coverage for reversible contraception
hinges upon the meaning of the PDA.
Consider some defenses employers might offer to the assertion that
excluding contraception from an otherwise comprehensive benefit
program constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex. First, an employer
might argue that excluding contraception from coverage is not sex
discrimination because the exclusion is not made "on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."'75 Second, an
employer might assert that because insurance policies available in the
commercial market typically exclude contraceptive services from
coverage, the employer should not be required to include such coverage.
Finally, some employers might assert that freedom of religious
conscience allows them to deny coverage for contraception. These
arguments will be considered in turn.
1. The Language of the PDA Excludes Contraception Coverage
The first likely response to the claim that the PDA prohibits excluding
contraception from coverage is that the PDA requires equality only in
relation to "pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions."76
Contraception is not included in this list. Contraception is about avoiding
pregnancy and childbirth, employers could argue, not about protecting
pregnant women from discrimination.
This argument, that the only effect of the PDA is to reverse Gilbert's
narrow holding that discrimination against pregnant workers is not sex
discrimination, was advanced by the employers in Newport News
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC.77 The plaintiffs challenged an
employee benefit program that provided comprehensive benefits to
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in
section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. This subsection shall not
require an employer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion, except where the life of
the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or except where medical
complications have arisen for an abortion: Provided, that nothing herein shall preclude an
employer from providing abortion benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in regard
to abortion.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
77. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
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workers and spouses, but denied pregnancy benefits to workers' wives.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Powell, dissented. They embraced a
strict reading of the PDA and urged that the first clause of the PDA,
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions," must be read as limited by the statute's
second requirement that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work.""8 According to the dissent, the PDA "speaks
only of female employees affected by pregnancy and says nothing about
spouses of male employees." '79
According to the majority, however, neither the words of the statute
nor its legislative history supported the dissent's narrow reading of the
statute. The majority recognized instead that the language of the PDA
reflects a broad remedial purpose. "The 1978 Act makes clear that it is
discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than
other medical conditions.... "[F]or all Title VII purposes, discrimination
based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of
her sex."'. "The meaning of the first clause [of the PDA] is not limited
by the specific language in the second clause, which explains the
application of the general principle to women employees." 2 In short, the
PDA broadly requires employers to treat equally pregnancy and
pregnancy-related conditions for which benefits are provided to an
employee or his or her otherwise qualified dependents.
The Court also has recognized repeatedly that the protection of
Title VII, as amended by the PDA, is not limited to women who are
already pregnant. For example, in International Union, UA W v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 3 the Court held that an employer's policy excluding
women from certain jobs because of concern for the health of the
employee's potential fetus violated Title VII as amended by the PDA. 4
The Court found that the PDA's prohibition on pregnancy discrimination
78. Id. at 687-88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 684.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 678 n.14.
83. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
84. Id. at 206.
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applies both to policies that affect pregnant women and those that affect
women's abilities to become pregnant.85 A policy that explicitly
classifies employees by their potential for pregnancy "[u]nder the
PDA ... must be regarded, for Title VII purposes, in the same light as
explicit sex discrimination."86
Likewise, the dissent in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert explained that
when evaluating a claim of discrimination by an insurance program, the
relevant classification is not between pregnant women and non-pregnant
individuals.87 Rather, the relevant classification is "between persons who
face a risk of pregnancy and those who do not."88 Similarly here, an
insurance program that excludes contraception from coverage
discriminates against people "who face a risk of pregnancy and those
who do not."89 By adopting the PDA, Congress explicitly affirmed the
reasoning and analysis of the Gilbert dissent. Courts have consistently
reaffirmed that the PDA protects not only pregnancy, but the risk of
pregnancy as well.91
The PDA's explicit abortion exclusion also supports the conclusion
that the Act's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
"pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions"92 includes a
prohibition against unfavorable treatment of contraceptive services. The
PDA specifically provides that the Act "shall not require an employer to
pay for health insurance benefits for abortion, except where the life of
the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or
except where medical complications have arisen from an abortion."'93 The
abortion exclusion makes plain that Congress understood that a law
prohibiting discrimination against benefits related to "pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions"'  would require coverage for
85. Id. at 199.
86. Id
87. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 161 n.5 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 161-62 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. For a summary of the legislative history expressly approving the views of the dissenting
Justices, see Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 679 n.17 (1983).
91. See id. at 684 ("The 1978 Act makes clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related
conditions less favorably than other medical conditions."); see also cases cited infra notes 96-97,
107.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
Washington Law Review
abortion unless Congress specified otherwise. The abortion exclusion
confirms that Congress understood that discrimination against pregnancy
and related medical conditions encompassed discrimination against
measures taken to avoid pregnancy. If Congress had intended to leave
employers free to disfavor contraceptive services in employee benefit
plans, Congress could have easily added the words "or contraception" to
the abortion exclusion. Congress did not do so.
Cases involving discrimination against women who seek treatment for
infertility also confirm that the PDA's prohibition against discrimination
on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions"95
must be read broadly to include insurance plans that treat contraception
disfavorably. In Pacourek v. Inland Steel96 and Erickson v. Board of
Governors,97 female employees were fired because they used sick leave
time to obtain infertility treatment.98 In both cases, the plaintiffs alleged
sex discrimination, while the employers argued that discrimination on the
basis of infertility did not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex
within the meaning of the PDA.99 The Pacourek court found in favor of
the plaintiffs, noting:
The basic theory of the PDA may be simply stated: Only women
can become pregnant; stereotypes based on pregnancy and related
medical conditions have been a barrier to women's economic
advancement; and classifications based on pregnancy and related
medical conditions are never gender-neutral. Discrimination against
an employee because she intends to, is trying to, or simply has the
potential to become pregnant is therefore illegal discrimination. It
makes sense to conclude that the PDA was intended to cover a
woman's intention or potential to become pregnant, because all that
conclusion means is that discrimination against persons who intend
to or can potentially become pregnant is discrimination against
t00
women ....
The legislative history of the PDA supports the Pacourek court's
conclusion. The House Report on the PDA stated, "In using the broad
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
96. 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. II. 1994).
97. 911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. I11. 1995).
98. Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 317-18; Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1396.
99. Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 319; Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1400-02.
100. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1401.
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phrase 'women affected by pregnancy, childbirth and related medical
conditions,' the bill makes clear that its protection extends to the whole
range of matters concerning the childbearing process."'0 ' Similarly,
Senator Harrison Williams, the chief sponsor of the Senate bill leading to
the PDA, observed, "[T]he overall effect of discrimination against
women because they might become pregnant, or do become pregnant, is
to relegate women in general, and pregnant women in particular, to a
second-class status." 2 Representative Ronald Sarasin expressed a
similar sentiment when he remarked that the PDA gives a woman "the
right.., to be financially and legally protected before, during, and after
her pregnancy."'103
The language of the PDA is expansive, covering "pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions."'" Furthermore, the legislative
history demonstrates that the language of the PDA-particularly because
of the phrase "related medical conditions"-was meant to be expansive.
The Pacourek court agreed when it stated that '.[r]elated' is a generous
choice of wording, suggesting that interpretation should favor inclusion
rather than exclusion in the close cases."'0 5 Insurance coverage for
contraception should be included under this broad interpretation.
That the PDA prohibits discrimination against women who seek to
avoid pregnancy, as well as those who are pregnant, is confirmed by the
Act's prohibition of discrimination against women who have had an
abortion. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
Guidelines, adopted at the time of the PDA's enactment, interpret the
PDA to mean that an employer may not discharge, refuse to hire, or
otherwise discriminate against a woman because she had an abortion.0 6
Similarly, in Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 107 the Sixth Circuit held
that Title VII, as amended by the PDA, prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee who has, or contemplates having, an
abortion. The court said, "Since an employer cannot take adverse
employment action against a female employee for her decision to have an
101. H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 5 (1978), reprinted'in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4745,4753.
102. 123 Cong. Rec. 29,385 (daily ed., Sept 15, 1977) (statement of Sen. Williams).
103. 124 Cong. Rec. 38,574 (daily ed., Oct. 14, 1978) (statement of Rep. Sarasin).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994) (emphasis added).
105. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1402.
106. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1604 (1997) ("An employer cannot discriminate in its employment
practices against a woman who has had an abortion.").
107. 85 F.3d 1211, 1214 (6th Cir. 1996).
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abortion, it follows that the same employer also cannot take adverse
employment action against a female employee for merely thinking about
what she has a right to do."1 Because the discrimination prohibited by
the PDA encompasses discrimination against women who have
abortions, a fortiori, it encompasses discrimination against women who
seek services designed to prevent conception.
A final difficulty with the argument that the PDA does not prohibit
discrimination against measures to avoid pregnancy is that medical
treatment is also about avoiding undesired consequences. 9 Virtually all
employment-based insurance plans include coverage for preventive
services such as screening exams to detect problems in healthy people,"0
as well as coverage for treatments that can delay or avoid adverse
consequences."' Much of what standard medical practice does, and much
of what health insurance pays for, is avoiding damaging consequences to
the patient that will be more costly in the long run. Excluding
contraception-also a preventive measure-from coverage effectively
discriminates against employees who want to avoid the undesired
consequence of pregnancy.
In sum, an employee benefit plan that provides comprehensive
coverage for all prescription drugs and devices except those used to
avoid unwanted pregnancy discriminates against women and violates
108. Id.
109. Primary care providers have long sought the opportunity to intervene early in the course of
diseases or even before their onset, and the benefits of incorporating prevention into medical practice
have become increasingly apparent over the past 20 to 30 years. See generally U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Healthy People 2000: Midcourse Review and 1995 Revisions 3 (1996)
(summarizing measures to avoid premature death, serious illness, and chronic disability).
110. See Paul S. Frame et al., U.S. Preventive Services Task Force: Highlights of the 1996 Report,
55 Am. Fam. Physician 567 (1997). For example, most employment-based insurance plans cover
mammography to detect breast cancer, although different policies pay on different terms based on
cost-benefit assessments. See generally David M. Eddy, Rationing Resources While Improving
Quality: How to Get More for Less, 272 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 817 (1994) (assessing costs and benefits
of covering various preventive services).
111. Estrogen replacement therapy to forestall osteoporosis and other diseases is the most
commonly prescribed treatment in the United States. See IMS America, IMS Reports New Products,
Patent Expirations and DTC Advertising Prompt Shifts in 1997 U.S. Pharmaceutical Rankings
(Feb. 26, 1988) <http://www.ims-america.com/communicationsfpr_rank.htm> ("In terms of pre-
scriptions dispensed, American Home's estrogen replacement drug, Premarin, held its lead spot in
1997 .... "). For other discussions of estrogen's role in disease prevention, see OnHealth,
Estrogen, Bones & Breast Cancer (Nov. 26, 1996) <http://www.healthnet.ivi.com/hnews/961 1/htrn/
estrogen.htm>, OnHealth, Hormone Replacement and Alzheimer's (Sept. 20, 1996) <http://www.
healthnet.ivi.com/hnews/9609/htmhormone.htm>, and OnHealth, Hormone Therapy: A Lifesaver?
(Feb. 13, 1995) <http://www.healthnet.ivi.com/hnews/9602/htrm/lifesave.htm>.
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Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Employers'
claims that the PDA should be read narrowly to exclude coverage for
contraception are inconsistent with the language of Title VII and with the
U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act.
2. Commercial Market Health Insurance Policies Exclude
Contraception Coverage
A second employer response to the claim that the PDA prohibits
excluding contraception from coverage is that health insurance policies
available in the commercial market typically exclude contraception. The
U.S. Supreme Court considered and decisively rejected this defense in
Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris."' According to the Court:
It would be inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of
Title VII to hold that an employer who adopts a discriminatory
fringe benefit plan can avoid liability on the ground that he could
not find a third party willing to treat his employees on a
nondiscriminatory basis. An employer who confronts such a
situation must either supply the fringe benefit himself, without the
assistance of any third party, or not provide it at all."'
Title VII directly prohibits discrimination only by employers, not by
insurance companies.' 4 Some states, however, have created an additional
cause of action against insurance companies that aid and abet employer
discrimination prohibited by state or federal law."5 In Colorado Civil
Rights Commission v. Travelers Insurance Co.," 6 for instance, a state
court considered a claim against both an employer and an insurance
company for denying coverage for normal-birth deliveries in violation of
the PDA. The insurance company had offered the employer the choice
between policies excluding and including coverage for normal
delivery."7 The company selected the more limited policy, excluding
112. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
113. Id at 1090.
114. Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more employees and "any agent" of the employer.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
115. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-34-402(1)(e) (West 1990). ("It shall be a discriminatory
or unfair employment practice: for any person, whether or not an employer... [t]o aid, abet, incite,
compel, or coerce the doing of any act [that violates the employment discrimination laws].").
116. 759 P.2d 1358 (Colo. 1988).
117. Id. at 1360.
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coverage for pregnancy."' The court found the insurance company
liable, explaining that the company "could not disclaim responsibility for
aiding and abetting a discriminatory practice... simply because it
offered [the employer] the option of selecting a policy providing
comprehensive coverage for pregnancy..... 9
3. Religious Convictions Permit Excluding Contraception Coverage
Finally, some employers might assert that the employers' or other
employees' religious convictions that contraception is immoral justify
excluding contraception from general coverage for prescription drugs
and medical services. Religious opposition to contraception has been a
central factor in recent debates on proposed state laws requiring
insurance coverage for contraception. 2 ° Title VII includes a special
exemption for religious organizations, which provides that the
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of race or gender does not
apply "to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its
activities."'' In addition, Title VII provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire
and employ employees.., on the basis of... religion, sex, or
national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise .... 122
Despite the language of Title VII, courts have interpreted these
exemptions narrowly to prohibit invidious discrimination on the basis of
gender. For example, a Jesuit university was allowed to require that a
118. Id.
119. Id. The court stated further, "Travelers cannot avoid responsibility for conduct aiding and
abetting a discriminatory act on the ground that it had no intent to discriminate." Id. at 1369.
120. See infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (1994).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
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faculty member in the philosophy department be Jesuit,'" but a Christian
school was not entitled to fire a pregnant, unmarried teacher, even
though the school claimed that the teacher's actions violated the church's
moral and doctrinal precepts. 24 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that
the religious-based exemptions from Title VII's prohibition against
discrimination apply only to hiring and firing decisions, and not to
benefit determinations.125
Courts also hold that requiring people to contribute, through taxes or
employee benefit contributions, to activities they consider immoral is not
a burden on freedom of religious conscience. For example, an Amish
farmer could not avoid paying social security tax simply because the tax
violated his religious belief.'26 This general principle is not limited to
taxation. Students who asserted that their religious beliefs prevented
them from contributing to their university's health care system because it
financed abortion services failed to state a claim under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.' 27
Although federal law and the laws of many states protect health care
workers who refuse to perform abortions for reasons of conscience, ' 28
123. Pime v. Loyola Univ., 585 F. Supp. 435, 441-43 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 803 F.2d 351
(7th Cir. 1986).
124. Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980). The court also noted that
there was a triable question whether males who engaged in premarital intercourse in violation of the
church's moral code were likewise discharged. Id at 270 n.5; see also EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ'g
Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (rejecting defense made by religious publishing
house against unlawful retaliation claim that discharge was effected because plaintiff was
"unresponsive to spiritual counsel"), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1982).
125. Barbara Lindemann & Paul Grossman, I Employment Discrimination Law 255 (3d ed.
1996). For example, in EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, the court invalidated a health insurance
benefit plan that, because of a religious belief that the male was the head of household, provided
benefits only to single persons and married men. 781 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1986). The court
found that this policy did not fit within Title VII's narrow religious exemption and emphasized that
Title VII exempts religious employers "only with respect to discrimination based on religion, and
then only with respect to persons hired to carry out the employer's 'religious activities."' Id. The
court also held that the BFOQ exception "does not apply to the full range of possibly discriminatory
employment actions," as the statute uses only the terms "hire" and "employ." Id.
126. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1981); see also Droz v. Commissioner, 48 F.3d
1120 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying self-employed social security tax exemption to taxpayer who had
religious objections to social security), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996).
127. Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Goehring v. del
Junco, 117 S. Ct. 1335 (1997); see also St. Agnes Hosp. of Baltimore v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319
(D. Md. 1990) (holding withdrawal of hospital accreditation for refusal to provide family planning
training did not violate hospital's religious freedom).
128. See Bruce G. Davis, Defining the Employment Rights of Medical Personnel Within the
Parameters of Personal Conscience, 3 Det. C.L. Rev. 847, 868 (1986).
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these laws provide no support for a religious employer who seeks to
exclude contraception from an employee benefit plan. First, such
conscience clauses are limited to abortion and do not include
contraception. 29 Further, neither employers who provide coverage
for contraceptive services nor their employees are required as a result of
that financial contribution to use contraception themselves. Thus, the
religious conviction justification for excluding contraceptive services
from employer-based insurance plans carries little weight.
IV. FACTORS EXPLAINING THE PERSISTENCE OF
UNFAVORABLE TREATMENT OF CONTRACEPTION
IN HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS
Two main factors explain why no one has raised a Title VII challenge
to the common exclusion of contraceptives from otherwise compre-
hensive health insurance coverage. First, women affected by this
exclusion, and indeed responsible employers, have difficulty obtaining
even basic information about insurance coverage. Second, there are few
lawyers available who are willing to take the financial risk necessary to
raise these claims.
A. The Selection and Negotiation ofHealth Insurance Coverage
Typically, an employer either selects a health insurance plan for
employees or offers employees a choice of plans with different features
at different costs. 3 ' Unfortunately, both employees and employers
confront great difficulty in obtaining information about what is covered
and what is excluded from health insurance plans. Following the Alan
Guttinacher Institute's 1995 study revealing that most U.S. health
insurers exclude contraception from otherwise comprehensive coverage
for prescription drugs,' 3' some employers and employees sought more
detailed information about coverage in their own plans. They confronted
great difficulty, however, obtaining detailed information about what their
plans covered and excluded.'
129. Id. at 853-54; see also Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (holding that
physician's moral refusal to work on drug developed by Ortho was not justified).
130. See, e.g., Rosenblatt et al., supra note 56, at 243-44.
131. Uneven & Unequal, supra note 13, at 12.
132. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 56, at 243-44. For example, Susan C. Rosenfeld, former general
counsel of the Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center and a breast cancer patient and prospective
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An employer or insurer that fails to provide information about what an
insurance plan does or does not cover violates the law. Under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the federal law
governing employee benefits,133 and under the laws of several states,'34
employees must receive understandable information about their
insurance coverage. But these laws are frequently ignored.'35 Women
HMO enrollee, telephoned six major HMOs in New York City in 1994 to ascertain their policies
regarding breast cancer treatment. One eventually responded. The others refused to supply contracts
or to disclose exclusions. One representative volunteered: "You don't know [what is covered] until
you actually hand in that claim form." Id. at 244 (citing Susan C. Rosenfeld, So You Want to Join an
H.M.O.? GoodLuck, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1994, at A23).
When Janet Benshoof, President of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, read the 1995
Alan Guttmacher Institute study, she asked the Center's insurer to give her information about
coverage for contraception and other reproductive health services. Even as an employer, she
discovered information was still hard to obtain. Eventually, Benshoof learned that her organization's
health insurer excluded coverage for all contraception except three generic formulas for birth control
pills only available by mail order. The Center has set up a self-insured program to cover these costs.
Interview with Janet Benshoof, President, Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, New York
(May 5, 1997).
In 1997, Cary LaCheen, who joined the NYU Law Faculty after a career fighting insurance
discrimination against people with disabilities, attempted to obtain information about the benefits
package provided to NYU employees by Oxford Health Plans. Despite the fact that managed care
plans in New York are required by N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 4408(l) to provide extensive
information to both enrollees and prospective enrollees on their benefits packages, she was unable to
obtain this information after oral and written requests to both NYU and Oxford. Only after filing
complaints with the New York State Department of Insurance and the New York State Department
of Health did she receive such information. The New York State Department of Health subsequently
issued a Statement of Deficiencies to Oxford based on her complaint. If a seasoned advocate had
such difficulty obtaining basic information on a health plan's coverage limits and exclusions, it is
fair to assume that most individuals, who have less knowledge of the law requiring such disclosure,
do as well. Interviews with Cary LaCheen, Lawyering Instructor, NYU Law School, New York
(June 3, 1997 & Sept. 9, 1997); see also infra note 134.
133. Under ERISA, employees are entitled to a summary describing their employee benefit plans
"written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and... sufficiently
accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights
and obligations under the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (1994). Employers who fail to comply with
this requirement "may in the court's discretion be personally liable to such participant or beneficiary
in the amount of up to $100 a day from the date of such failure or refusal, and the court may in its
discretion order such other relief as it deems proper." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) (1994).
134. In 1996, for example, the New York State Legislature passed an act providing:
Each subscriber, and upon request each prospective subscriber prior to enrollment, shall be
supplied with written disclosure information .... The information to be disclosed shall include
at least the following: (a) a description of coverage provisions; health care benefits; benefit
maximums, including benefit limitations; and exclusions of coverage, including the definition of
medical necessity used in determining whether benefits will be covered.
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 4408(1) (McKinney Supp. 1998).
135. See supra note 132.
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often learn that contraception is excluded when they receive a booklet
from the insurance plan, after they have enrolled, or when they submit a
claim and it is denied. 36 At that point, a woman's protest may be met
with the response that she has "chosen" a plan that does not cover
contraception. 37 Unfortunately, although employees are legally entitled
to information about what their health plan covers, and although plans
that exclude coverage for contraception may violate Title VII, few
individual women or employers have sufficient financial incentive to
address these legal violations. Both employers and employees are
concerned with a wide range of complex factors in selecting a health
insurance plan, and coverage for contraception may not be on the top of
anyone's list.
B. The Availability ofAttorneys to Enforce Title VII Claims
The general unavailability of lawyers to enforce Title VII claims also
prevents the initiation of more claims against employers for excluding
contraception from health insurance. First, private attorneys press claims
under the Civil Rights Act for individual clients who believe they have
suffered discrimination. These attorneys are the most important actors
enforcing U.S. civil rights laws. 31 Clients seek the help of these lawyers
136. See supra note 132.
137. C.f, e.g., Bushman v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am., 915 F. Supp. 945, 953 (N.D. I11.
1996) (lamenting that court was forced to deny coverage for respected, mainstream, life-saving
medical care because it was excluded in health insurance policy that claimant had never been able to
see). In Bushman, the insurance company did not send the policy to the employer until three months
after it went into effect. Id.; see also Hilliard v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 918 F. Supp. 1016
(S.D. Miss. 1995) (denying preliminary injunction forcing insurance company to pay for high dose
chemotherapy for multiple myeloma when plaintiff had chosen plan that did not cover procedure,
even though that choice had not been explained to him).
While the issue has not been addressed specifically, it seems that the fact that some of the plans
offered by an employer do not discriminate on the basis of sex should not defeat a challenge to an
employment-based health insurance plan that does discriminate. Despite the fact that a particular
plan includes discriminatory coverage provisions, the plan might be attractive to an employee for a
variety of reasons, such as because a long-time physician is a member of the plan's network. Tite
VII does not include a general defense based on the employee's ability to avoid sex discrimination
by picking a different job or a different benefit program. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying
text (explaining that insurance company cannot defend against state law violation of aiding and
abetting employer discrimination on ground that insurer offered employer both discriminatory and
non-discriminatory policies).
138. Title VII relies "on the private suit as a principal enforcement vehicle." Samuel Estreicher &
Michael C. Harper, Cases and Materials on the Law Governing the Employment Relationship 868
(1990).
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when they have suffered a serious injury such as the loss of a job or a
promotion. While Title VII provides attorneys' fees for lawyers who are
successful in civil rights claims,' private civil rights lawyers
customarily ask clients to pay out of pocket for the costs of litigation.
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted attorney fee statutes
to mean that lawyers may not receive enhanced fees for bringing claims
that are novel or uncertain.4 ° Given the costs of contraception and the
costs of litigation, individuals are unlikely to seek or find a lawyer to
raise challenges to discriminatory insurance plans that do not cover
contraception.
Second, civil rights organizations could bring suits arguing that
excluding contraceptive services violates the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act. But their resources are limited and many other serious issues
demand their attention. 4' Third, the EEOC, which has primary executive
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994) ("In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's fee... ).
140. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 730 (1987).
The risk of losing a lawsuit is not "an independent basis for increasing the amount of any otherwise
reasonable fee for the time and effort expended in prevailing." Id. at 725.
141. For example, the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy (CRLP) has challenged dozens of
state restrictions on Medicaid funding and restrictive informed consent laws, particularly for minors.
It persuaded the FDA to recognize the emergency use of contraceptive pills, defended testing for
RU-486, and challenged restrictions on birth control information on the intemet. See Center for
Reproductive Law & Policy, Press Advisory (Mar. 9, 1998) (challenging Florida partial-birth
abortion bill) (on file with Washington Law Review); Center for Reproductive Law & Policy,
Reproductive Freedom News (visited Apr. 2, 1998) <http://www.echonyc.com--comstop/> (citing
CRLP articles discussing internet issues); Center for Reproductive Law & Policy, Women of the
World: Formal Laws and Policies Affecting Their Reproductive Lives (1995) (visited Apr. 2, 1998)
<http://www.echonye.corn-jmkm/wotw/> (discussing women's reproductive rights issues in United
States and abroad).
During the 1996 U.S. Supreme Court term, the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDEF)
filed over a dozen briefs on issues including anti-abortion violence, child support enforcement,
employment discrimination, and peer sexual harassment in schools. See NOW Legal Defense &
Education Fund, 1996-1997 Legal Docket (1997). NOW LDEF has devoted enormous resources to
protecting access to abortion clinics and challenging laws that penalize poor women who have
children.
The National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL) worked to discourage
Congress from adopting a criminal prohibition on late-term abortions. See National Abortion &
Reproductive Rights Action League, Abortion Rights: Late Term Abortion Ban (visited Apr. 2,
1998) <http://www.naral.orglissueslateterm.html> (listing NARAL sites addressing late-term
abortions); see also National Abortion & Reproductive Rights Action League, 1998 Summary of
Findings on Reproductive Rights in the States (visited Apr. 2, 1998) <http://www.naral.org/
publications/whod98summary.html> (summarizing state-by-state review of abortion and repro-
ductive rights).
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responsibility for enforcing U.S. civil rights laws, could initiate litigation
or other efforts to discourage employers from discriminating against
women by excluding contraception from health insurance benefits
programs. In recent years, however, the small EEOC staff has struggled
with a backlog of bread-and-butter race and sex discrimination claims,
sought to address the problems of sexual harassment in the workplace,
and attempted to respond to a significant public and judicial backlash
against affirmative action programs.'42 With its energies focused on
simply maintaining its already established caseload, expecting the EEOC
to take on the new issue of employee benefit plan discrimination against
contraception seems unrealistic. Furthermore, Title VII does not
authorize the EEOC to issue regulations clarifying and implementing the
meaning of the statute. 43
Despite these fiscal and statutory limitations, the EEOC could do
more than it is currently to prevent employers from discriminating
against women by excluding contraceptives from coverage. For instance,
the EEOC could issue a general "enforcement guidance" memo" to
clarify that the PDA's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy and related conditions condemns employer policies that treat
contraception less favorably than other physician services and
prescription drugs. Alternatively, in response to a request by an
Other groups, including the Reproductive Freedom Projects of the American Civil Liberties Union
and the New York Civil Liberties Union have worked to assure that medical students and Ob.-Gyn.
residents have opportunities to learn how to perform abortions, and monitored hospital mergers so
abortion services would not disappear from a particular community or state. See ACLU
Reproductive Freedom Project, Biennial Report 1996-97, at 11 (on file with Washington Law
Review); see also American Civil Liberties Union, The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project
(visited Mar. 9, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/reproductabout.html> (describing Reproductive
Freedom Project work); New York Civil Liberties Union, NYCLU Reproductive Rights Project fact
sheet (on file with Washington Law Review) (describing project).
142. At the end of 1994, the EEOC had about 100,000 unresolved claims of race and sex
discrimination lawsuits pending, twice its 1992 backlog. Peter T. Kilbom, A Family Spirals
Downward in Waiting for Agency to Act, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1995, at Al. In recent years, the
EEOC has won substantial settlements in sexual harassment suits against Mitsubishi and Del
Laboratories. See Carey Goldberg, Company to Pay Record Amount in L.L Sexual Harassment Case,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1995, at Al; Andrew Pollck, Mitsubishi Wants Settlement of U.S. Sexual
Harassment Suit, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1996, at D1.
143. Congress explicitly limited the EEOC's regulation-issuing powers to procedural matters. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1994); see also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)
("Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or
regulations pursuant to that Title.") (citation omitted).
144. For an excellent discussion of this commonly used EEOC process, see Alfred W. Blumrosen,
The Binding Effect ofAffirmative Action Guidelines, 1 Lab. Law. 261 (1985).
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employer, state human rights commissioner, or interested party, the
EEOC could issue an opinion letter making the principle clear.'45 Given
that the EEOC's resources are miniscule relative to its responsibilities,
however, no inference about the meaning of the PDA should be drawn
from EEOC silence or inaction.
Further, the nature of the legal claim at issue here-the right of
women who seek to avoid pregnancy to obtain employee insurance
benefits that include contraceptive services-contributes to the lack of
incentive to assert the claim in court. However important the issue is in
the aggregate, the impact on individual women may be less significant.
For example, when a woman is fired as a result of sex discrimination, she
has a powerful incentive to sue: to get her job back and collect back pay.
In contrast, the regular cost of buying oral contraceptives, or even the
one-time cost of obtaining Norplant or an IUD, is smaller than the cost of
hiring a lawyer to enforce the legal claim. These facts affect the
incentives of both individual women and the attorneys who might
represent them.'46
V. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PDA
Although enforcing the PDA to require that contraception be treated
like other medical treatments would not increase access to birth control
for all women,'47 it would make a significant difference in making
contraception more accessible and less costly to many women. First, it
would make contraceptive services more accessible to large numbers of
working women. Second, it would make such coverage available to the
wives of men employed in companies that provide coverage for workers'
dependents. 4 Third, although a somewhat less certain argument,
145. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.91 (1997) ("Any interested person desiring a written Title VII
interpretation or opinion from the Commission may make such a request.").
146. The out-of-pocket costs of contraceptives are most burdensome for poor women. In recent
years, advocates for the poor have had a full plate of work seeking Medicaid and Title X funding for
family planning services. Nonetheless, these programs are limited and most women with incomes
below the federal poverty line do not qualify for federally financed contraceptives. Frost, supra note
49, at 98; see also supra note 49 (discussing Title X).
147. Title VII only applies to employment-related insurance policies. See, e.g., Lutcher v.
Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1980) (explaining that Title VII applies only
where there is some connection with employment relationship).
148. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983). The court
held that employers are not required to provide any coverage for spouses, but to the extent that they
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applying the PDA to contraception would make services available to the
teenaged dependents of workers employed in jobs that offer coverage for
dependents.'49 Treating contraception the same as other medical services
might also help to make such services more socially acceptable to
impressionable teenagers. 5 0
Although it is not possible to document precise connections between
insurance coverage for contraception, contraceptive use, unwanted
pregnancy, and the tragic harms described in Part I, people who use
effective forms of contraception are less likely to get pregnant than those
who do not.' Common sense suggests that if physician services and
prescription drugs for contraception are included in insurance plans on
the same terms as other medical services and prescription drugs, more
do, they may not discriminate against pregnancy-related conditions. Id. at 683-84. Disfavorable
treatment of a spouse's pregnancy-related condition would constitute prohibited sex-based
discrimination against the male worker. Id; see also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1604.10 (1997).
149. One of the issues in Newport News was a colloquy in the legislative history of the PDA.
Compare Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678-82, with id at 691-93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). While
no one in Congress opposed the basic concept of the Act, some Senators, led by Senator Hatch,
offered limiting amendments. Senator Hatch observed that the language of the first section,
prohibiting discrimination against "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical
conditions" was very broad. Id at 692 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing 123 Cong. Rec. 29,643
(1977)). Senator Hatch asked, "[W]hat about the status of a woman coworker who is not pregnant
but rides with a pregnant woman and cannot get to work once the pregnant female commences her
maternity leave or the employed mother who stays home to nurse her pregnant daughter? Are they
women 'affected by' pregnancy?" Id. at 681 (citing Cong. Rec. 29,644). Senator Williams, the lead
sponsor of the bill, protested that the PDA would not cover those situations. Senator Hatch
concluded by asking, "[T]his act only applies to the particular woman who is actually pregnant, who
is an employee and has become pregnant after her employment?" Id. at 693 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing Cong. Rec. 29,644). Senator Williams responded, "Exactly." I (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing Cong. Rec. 29,644).
Apparently relying upon this legislative history, the EEOC guidelines do not require equal
treatment of workers' male and female children. They provide: "[lnsurance does not have to cover
the pregnancy-related conditions of other dependents as long as it excludes the pregnancy-related
conditions of the dependents of male and female employees equally." 29 C.F.tR app. § 1604.10
Thus, EEOC guidelines appear to allow an employer to provide comprehensive health insurance for
workers' dependent male children and no coverage for female children, or visa versa, so long as the
children of male and female workers are treated in an equally discriminatory way.
This interpretation of Title VII and the PDA seems inconsistent with the larger remedial purpose
of the law. All women are hurt when female dependents are denied coverage for pregnancy-related
services. The fact that the daughters of male workers as well as female workers are equally
disadvantaged does not make the sex-based discrimination acceptable.
150. Teenagers in the United States experience higher rates of unintended pregnancy than those in
most other developed countries. See Jones et al., supra note 4, at 54. While mass media and culture
encourage sex, U.S. teens have less access to contraceptive information and services than teens in
other countries. Id.
151. See discussion supra Part II.
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people will use effective forms of contraception. In part, the effect is
economic. If the drug or service is covered by insurance, people on tight
budgets are more likely to use them. But the effect is not simply
economic. When an insurance program that provides broad coverage for
physician, services and prescription drugs excludes coverage for
contraception, that exclusion conveys a message that discourages
contraception.
VI. THE CONTRACEPTION DISCRIMINATION PROBLEM:
ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE PDA
Federal regulatory or judicial enforcement of the PDA is only one
means by which discrimination against women seeking coverage for
contraceptive services might be addressed. In the 1990s, a growing
number of pro-choice women's organizations and individuals have begun
to address the problem of insurance coverage for contraception as well.'52
Employers should be educated to understand that excluding coverage for
contraception burdens women and generates financial costs that are
significantly greater than those of providing insurance for contraception.
A. State Legislation
In the late 1990s, several states have considered measures to remedy
the common problem of insurance plans treating contraceptive services
unfavorably. These legislative approaches, debated in California,'53
152. See, e.g., Uneven & Unequal, supra note 13; Center for Reproductive Law & Policy,
Improving Access to Contraception: A Plan for Action (1997) (on file with author); Center for
Reproductive Law & Policy Contraceptive Conference, New York, N.Y. (July 18-20, 1997).
153. See Dana Wilkie, Birth Control Benefits Bill Vetoed: Measure Sought to Reduce Unwanted
Pregnancies, San Diego Union-Tribune, Oct. 18, 1995, at A3. In 1997, one newspaper reported that
contraceptives:
remain the one class of federally approved drug benefits most frequently refused coverage by
health insurers across the country. That omission has inspired legislation supported by more
than two dozen women's groups and medical associations who want to make contraceptive
coverage universal in every group or individual policy issued in California.
Catherine Bridge, Contraceptive Drug Coverage Could Be a Health-Plan "Must," Sacramento Bee,
June 30, 1997, at IBI0.
Some California legislators have asserted that contraceptives are cheap and women can always pay
for them out of pocket. Interview with Kathy Kneer, Executive Director, Planned Parenthood
Affiliates of California (Apr. 20, 1998). Others have suggested that women could pay for
contraceptives with credit cards. Any medical service can, of course, be charged to a credit card, but
most people prefer insurance. Yet others suggested that contraception is similar to hair spray and
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Virginia,'54 New York,'55 and Connecticut,'56 would prohibit insurance
plans that treat contraception less favorably than other medical services
or prescription drugs. The debates in these states illuminate the
substantive issues at stake in considering whether basic health insurance
coverage should include payment for contraception. Three arguments
have been offered against mandatory equal coverage for contraception.
First, those who oppose legal requirements that treat contraception
equally with other physician services and prescription drugs have relied
on general arguments opposing laws requiring employers or health
insurers to provide coverage for particular benefits.'57 Second, opponents
of state laws requiring equal coverage for contraception further assert
that "a mandate would put too great a burden on small businesses."'58
Given that contraception costs much less than abortion, delivery, or the
should be financed out of pocket. But contraception costs much more than hair spray. Moreover,
contraceptives are prescription drugs, while hair spray is not. Finally, the adverse consequences of
unwanted pregnancy are much greater than the consequences of un-sprayed hair. Id.
In 1995 and 1998, Governor Pete Wilson vetoed bills that would have required coverage for
contraception. See Dan Bernstein, Contraceptive Coverage Mandate Vetoed, Sacramento Bee,
Feb. 12, 1998, atA3.
154. See David Ress, Birth Control Insurance Bill Dealt Setback; State Study Commission Votes
Against Mandating Coverage, Richmond Times Dispatch, Sept. 20, 1996, at B6. In 1996, one house
of the Virginia legislature passed laws to require both public and private employers to provide
insurance coverage for contraception. In 1997, however, Virginia adopted weakened laws requiring
public and private employers simply to offer coverage for contraception if the woman is willing to
pay an additional premium. See Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.1-20.1, 38.2-3407.5:1 (Michie Supp. 1997); see
also Patrick Lee Plaisance, Insurance Law on Birth Control Raises Questions, Newport News Daily
Press, Sept. 4, 1997, at 1.
155. In 1996 and 1997, the New York State Assembly passed a bill requiring that all insurers
providing prescription coverage also provide equal coverage for contraceptive prescriptions.
Although a similar bill was introduced in the State Senate, it was never considered. Planned
Parenthood of New York City, Planned Parenthood of New York City Supports the Equity in
Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 1998 (on file with Washington Law
Review).
156. See Jonathan Rabinovitz, Connecticut Lawmakers Try Again to Force Health Insurers to Pay
for Birth Control, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1998, at B5.
157. For example, in Virginia, George H. Heilig, Jr., Chair of the House Corporations, Insurance
and Banking Committee and of a commission on mandated benefits, said, "[I]t does take away [the]
choice the employer has in designing policies and from individuals in buying policies." Ress, supra
note 154, at B6.
158. This was the principal reason cited by Governor Pete Wilson when he vetoed the California
bill that would have required insurers to cover contraceptives to the same extent they cover other
prescription drugs. Statelines California: Women s Groups Denounce Contraception Veto, Health
Line (Am. Political Network), Oct. 23, 1995, available in Westlaw (10/23/95 APN-HE 8).
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treatment of newborns, which are typically covered by health
insurance,5 9 this cost argument is difficult to understand.
Third, opponents contend that contraceptive coverage would violate
the religious freedom of those who believe contraception is immoral. For
example, Catholic organizations led opposition to a proposed mandate in
California that required equal treatment for prescription contraception,
arguing that "religious hospitals and Catholic employers must abide by
ethical directives forbidding the use of contraceptive drugs to regulate
births."'" Most U.S. employers and hospitals, however, do not share
religious convictions forbidding the use of contraceptive devices. Even
Catholic employers who regard contraception as a sin cannot justify
discriminating against women on the basis of pregnancy or contraceptive
use.
161
B. ERISA Limitations on State Authority
ERISA 62 severely limits the traditional power of the states to regulate
insurance, prohibit discrimination, and promote health and welfare. One
goal of ERISA is to protect employers from conflicting commands of
state and federal law. 63 ERISA prohibits states from mandating benefits
or defining discrimination in self-insured employee benefit plans more
broadly than federal law.' 64 In areas where state and federal laws do not
conflict, ERISA preserves state authority to regulate insurance. States,
therefore, retain significant power to mandate benefits and prohibit
159. See supra notes 13 (contraception), 19 (abortion), and text accompanying note 15 (low birth
weight babies).
160. Wilkie, supra note 153, at A3; see also Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California,
AB 160-Action Alert!!! Tell the Governor: "Sign AB 160-My Conscience Needs Protection,
Too!," Jan. 29, 1998 (on file with Washington Law Review).
161. See supra Part III.B.3.
162. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
163. A central purpose of ERISA preemption is to protect employee benefit plans "by eliminating
the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation." Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463
U.S. 85, 99 (1983) (citation omitted).
164. ERISA provides that it "shall [not] be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law of the United States... or any rule or regulation issued under any such law."
29 U.S.C. § 1144(d). It also prohibits states from requiring employee benefit plans to cover
particular medical conditions or services. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,
747 (1985).
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insurance discrimination in all health insurance programs other than
those of self-insured employee benefit plans covered by ERISA.
165
Since 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA narrowly
to allow states greater flexibility to regulate health insurance plans
traditionally within the scope of ERISA.'" Despite this new federal
recognition of state power to regulate health insurance, this section
assumes that ERISA still prohibits states from imposing mandatory
benefit requirements or anti-discrimination rules that go beyond what is
required by federal law.
C. State Authority to Enforce Title VII
Even though ERISA prohibits states from imposing mandatory benefit
requirements or anti-discrimination rules that go beyond what is required
by federal law, states continue to play an important role in interpreting
and enforcing Title VII. As the enforcer of federal law, a state may-and
indeed it must-interpret Title VII as amended by the PDA.
Washington State leads the nation in legislation addressing insurance
coverage for contraception. In 1973, prior to the adoption of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the state Human Rights Division adopted
a rule requiring the following: "Insurance benefits provided by the
employer must be equal for male and female employees. For example:
(a) If full health insurance coverage is provided for male employees, then
165. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 744.
166. In 1995, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court held that ERISA does not preempt state laws,
including hospital rate regulations, that have only an "indirect" impact on ERISA plans. New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 660-62
(1995). While Travelers gives an important green light to state regulation of ERISA plans, that case
and those that followed have consistently suggested that state laws mandating the inclusion of
particular benefits in employee benefit plans are not similarly free from ERISA preemption. In
Travelers, the Court distinguished state "mandates affecting coverage," suggesting that ERISA
would preempt such laws. Id. at 657. In De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund,
the Court rejected an ERISA challenge to a New York law that imposed a special tax on the gross
receipts of hospitals. The Court noted in dicta that the law was not one that "required employers to
provide certain benefits." 117 S. Ct. 1747, 1752 (1997) (citation omitted). Similarly, Napoletano v.
Cigna Healthcare of Conn., Inc. rejected an ERISA challenge to a claim against an employee benefit
plan under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1106 (1997). The court noted that state law did not "dictate the benefits that the employer
must offer." Id. at 138; see also Safeco Life Ins. Co. v. Musser, 65 F.3d 647, 653 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that state fees imposed on insurer selling stop-loss coverage to self-funded employee
welfare benefits plans did not relate to those plans, and therefore, were not preempted by ERISA).
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full coverage, including maternity and abortion, must be provided for
female employees."' 67
In 1991, Washington voters affirmed this commitment to reproductive
choice, adopting Initiative 120, which provides:
(1) Every individual has the fundamental right to choose or refuse
birth control;
(2) Every woman has the fundamental right to choose or refuse to
have an abortion... ;
(3) Except as specifically permitted by [this Act], the state shall
not deny or interfere with a woman's fundamental right to
choose or refuse to have an abortion; and
(4) The state shall not discriminate against the exercise of these
rights in the regulation or provision of benefits, facilities,
services, or information."'
Insofar as these Washington provisions affirm, clarify, and enforce the
requirements of the PDA, they constitute state implementation of federal
anti-discrimination requirements and are not preempted by ERISA. But
to avoid federal ERISA preemption, Washington lawmakers must act to
implement the federal law, and not rely simply on their own local sense
of justice.
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.169 is the central case addressing the
relationship between state implementation of Title VII and federal
preemption of state laws that relate to employee benefit plans. Shaw
arose in 1976 when, two weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court's Gilbert
decision holding that Title VII did not prohibit discrimination against
pregnant women,70 the New York Court of Appeals held that an
"employer whose employee benefit plan treats pregnancy differently
from other nonoccupational disabilities engages in sex discrimination
167. Wash. Admin. Code 162-30-020(7) (1973), reprinted in Wash. Admin. Code, vol. 6 (1959-
1976). Note that the regulation does not mention contraception. Is this a significant omission or did
the legislature assume that contraception coverage was obvious? It seems to the author that a
legislature willing to mandate coverage for abortion in 1973 probably would have assumed that
contraception was routinely covered.
168. Reproductive Privacy Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 9.02.100(1)-(4) (1996).
169. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
170. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The Shaw Court notes the two-week
coincidence. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 88-89.
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within the meaning of the [New York] Human Rights Law."'' Thus, the
New York law prohibiting health insurance discrimination against
pregnant women came into direct conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of Title VII in Gilbert. While New York was free to apply
a concept of discrimination broader than that defined by Title VII to
actors other than ERISA plans, the Court in Shaw held that the ERISA
preemption prohibited the state from applying the broader law to ERISA
plans during the period after the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1976 that
Title VII did not prohibit discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and
before the effective date of the PDA in 1978.172
In its analysis of this claim, the Court began by recognizing that
"[s]tate laws obviously play a significant role in the enforcement of
Title VII." ' 73 Title VII expressly preserves state anti-discrimination laws
that do not conflict with it. 74 Moreover, Title VII requires recourse to
available state administrative remedies, and the EEOC accords
"substantial weight" to state administrative determinations."'5 Thus, the
Shaw Court concluded, "Given the importance of state fair employment
laws to the federal enforcement scheme, [federal ERISA] pre-emption of
the [state] Human Rights Law would impair Title VII to the extent that
the Human Rights Law provides a means of enforcing Title VII's
commands."'7 Therefore, the Court held that ERISA prevented New
York from imposing a rule that was flatly inconsistent with Title VII as
then interpreted.'77
171. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 88 (citing Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights
Appeal Bd., 359 N.E.2d 393 (N.Y. 1976)).
172. Id. at 108.
173. Id. at 101.
174. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7). This section of Title VII states:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability,
duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State or political
subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of
any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1994).
175. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 101-02 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)).
176. Id. at 102.
177. "We hold that New York's Human Rights Law is pre-empted with respect to ERISA benefit
plans only insofar as it prohibits practices that are lawful under federal law." Id. at 108 (emphasis
added).
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At the same time, the Shaw Court recognized that states play a vital
role in interpreting and implementing Title VII. In dealing with ERISA
plans that may not be subject to state regulation:
Courts and state agencies, rather than considering whether
employment practices are unlawful under a broad state law, will
have to determine whether they are prohibited by Title VII. If they
are not, the state law will be superseded and the agency will lack
authority to act. It seems more than likely, however, that state
agencies and courts are sufficiently familiar with Title VII to apply
it in their adjudicative processes." 78
The Court here underscores that, under Title VII, state courts and
agencies must consider, interpret, and enforce federal Title VII law as
well as state anti-discrimination laws. If a practice is not regulated by
Title VII, then ERISA precludes the state from regulating it in the
context of employee benefit plans. If, however, a practice is prohibited
by Title VII, the state may act and state authority is not preempted by
ERISA.
The only other case addressing the conflict between anti-
discrimination rules and ERISA preemption of state regulation is
Champion International Corp. v. Brown.'7 9 In Brown, the Montana
Human Rights Commission found that an ERISA employer pension plan
violated the Montana age discrimination law, because it gave no credit
for service after age sixty-five. 80 The pension plan challenged by the
state regulators in Brown was "in compliance with ERISA provisions and
the treasury regulations interpreting them."'' As in Shaw, federal law
specifically addressed the issue,'82 but the state sought to apply a rule
inconsistent with federal law. The Ninth Circuit held that ERISA does
not allow states to subject employers to rules that are flatly inconsistent
with federal law.83
178. Id. at 105-06.
179. 731 F.2d 1406 (9th. Cir. 1984).
180. Id. at 1407.
181. Id.
182. Federal law provides: "The term 'normal retirement age' means the earlier of: (A) the time a
plan participant attains normal retirement age under the plan, or, (3) the later of: (i) the time a plan
participant attains age 65, or (ii) the 5th anniversary of the time a plan participant commenced
participation in the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (1994).
183. Brown, 731 F.2d at 1409.
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In relation to contraception, Washington's rules are the most
reasonable interpretation of the PDA. Insofar as state rules implement
and enforce the federal PDA, they are not preempted by ERISA. This
analysis suggests that Washington and other states are free to interpret
the federal PDA to prohibit health insurance plans from discriminating
against contraception and to apply such an anti-discrimination rule to
plans governed by ERISA. Washington's regulation' prohibits plans
that disfavor maternity and abortion services, but does not explicitly
address the question of coverage for contraception. The Washington
Reproductive Privacy Act' prohibits insurance plans that disfavor either
birth control or abortion. The analysis offered here suggests that ERISA
precludes states from applying these state rules to plans governed by
ERISA. Under Title VII, a state may interpret Title VII and apply those
interpretations to ERISA plans, but may not apply state law that is
inconsistent with Title VII to ERISA plans.
Washington's prohibition against insurance plans that do not cover
abortion is inconsistent with Title VII and is preempted by ERISA. The
federal PDA explicitly authorizes insurance plans to exclude abortion
from coverage,' 86 except in narrow circumstances. Under Shaw and
Brown, therefore, Washington may not apply its discrimination rules
regarding abortion to ERISA plans. In contrast, under the analysis of the
PDA in this Article, the Washington prohibition against excluding
contraception from coverage would simply be implementing Title VII as
amended by the PDA, and would not be preempted by ERISA. 1'87
Because ERISA preempts so much of states' traditional authority to
regulate the content of benefits provided by employment-based health
insurance programs, federal approaches-either through interpretation
and enforcement of the existing provisions of Title VII or through new
federal legislation-are particularly important.
184. See supra text accompanying note 167.
185. See supra text accompanying note 168.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
187. Catherine L. Fisk advances a similar analysis, arguing that ERISA does not preempt state
authority to require employers to provide benefits for same-sex domestic couples because the federal
Defense of Marriage Act has recognized state power to regulate in this area. See Catherine L. Fisk,
ERISA Preemption of State and Local Laws on Domestic Partnership and Sexual Orientation
Discrimination in Employment, 8 UCLA Women's L.J. (forthcoming June 1998).
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D. Federal ERISA Amendment
In yet another approach to this issue, in May 1997, a bipartisan
coalition of senators introduced the Equity in Prescription Insurance and
Contraceptive Coverage Act of 1997 (EPICC), which would prohibit
discrimination against contraception in insurance coverage. 8 A federal
law such as EPICC would avoid ERISA preemption of state efforts to
define discrimination or mandate benefits. EPICC is modeled after the
Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, which amended
ERISA to require that health insurance plans allow doctors and women
to decide how long the woman needs to stay in the hospital following the
birth of a child.8 9
From a policy perspective, one could question the wisdom of
Congress making health insurance coverage decisions on a condition-by-
condition basis." Moreover, as this Article has argued, the proposed
federal regulation may be superfluous in that the PDA already requires
coverage of contraception. 9' But as this Article has also pointed out, the
PDA's application to insurance coverage for contraception has been
widely ignored; an additional federal law clarifying that excluding
contraception from insurance coverage may be salutatory. It is not
uncommon for Congress to adopt "redundant" legislation. 92 In these
188. S. 766, 105th Cong. (1997). The proposed act contains the following factual findings:
Congress finds that-(l) each year, approximately 3,600,000 pregnancies, or nearly 60 percent
of all pregnancies, in this country are unintended; (2) contraceptive services are part of basic
health care, allowing families to both adequately space desired pregnancies and avoid
unintended pregnancy; (3) studies show that contraceptives are cost effective: for every $1 of
public funds invested in family planning, $4 to $14 of public funds is saved in pregnancy and
health care-related costs; (4) by reducing rates of unintended pregnancy, contraceptives help
reduce the need for abortion; (5) unintended pregnancies lead to higher rates of infant mortality,
low-birth weight, and maternal morbidity, and threaten the economic viability of families ....
Id. § 2.
189. Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2935 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185, 42 U.S.C.S.
§§ 300gg-4, 300gg-51).
190. Commentators have observed that several factors supported this legislation. Eugene
Declercq & Diana Simmes, The Politics of "Drive-Through Deliveries ". Putting Early Postpartum
Discharge on the Legislative Agenda, 75 Milbank Q. 175, 184-85 (1997). The early discharge laws
are incremental and simple. The issue unites physicians and consumers against insurance companies.
Id. at 186-87. Perhaps most important, the laws require no public spending. Id. at 187-88. The
authors ask whether "the passage of early discharge legislation [was] the forerunner of an outpouring
of incremental, largely symbolic health legislation targeted at key constituencies." Id. at 197.
191. See supra Part IH.B.
192. For example, in 1994 Congress adopted the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
(FACE) to provide criminal penalties and civil remedies against "whomever-by force or threat of
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circumstances, an ad hoc congressional effort to address real human
problems may make sense.
VII. CONCLUSION
Unintended pregnancy is a serious problem in the United States.
Insurance policies that exclude contraception from otherwise
comprehensive coverage for prescription drugs and medical services
contribute to this problem. Excluding contraception from employment-
based insurance violates the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Women, employers, the EEOC, private
lawyers, and states should use the analysis presented here to do all that
they can to seek equal coverage for contraceptive services.
force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with" any person who
is or has been "obtaining or providing reproductive health services." 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1995). This
law is "redundant" in that state common law and criminal statutes prohibit the conduct addressed by
FACE, and a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court held in National Organization for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994), that anti-choice violence and harassment could be prosecuted under
the federal anti-racketeering statute.
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